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An imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil purpose of
thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation would
copy the major features of the extraordinary remedies.'
Thus Kenneth Culp Davis describes the use of extraordinary
remedies in the judicial review of administrative decisions. In a
broader context, however, the statement depicts the entire system
of state judicial review of administrative decisions.2 When seeking
the proper remedy, the practitioner is faced with a bewildering
number of choices; 3 an improper choice may result in the loss of
his case.4
The resulting complexity of review procedures has impeded
the development of uniform standards of judicial review. Instead
of focusing on the substance of the litigated claim, administrative
decisions have tended to consider primarily the form of the review
I K. DAvIS, ADMImTRATV LAW TEXT § 24.01 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as DAvis].
2 The term "judicial review" in this article refers to the judicial review of
administrative decisions. One authority has stated, "The statutory appeals proce-
dures are ordinarily created separately, a method of appeal being enacted with
creation of each new agency. The resulting patchwork is characterized by a lack of
uniform pattern comparable to that of the old fashioned crazy quilt." 2 F. COOPER,
STATE ADrm IrVE LAw 603-04 (1965). This resulting "patchwork" has been
caused to some extent because administrative law has never been constitutionally
sanctioned or theoretically well developed. J. LADis, THE ADMINISTTrV PROCESS
2-5 (1938). Administrative judicial reivew may be provided by (1) specific statutory
provisions; (2) general statutory provisions; or (3) non-statutory review. W.
GuMLonN & C. BYsE, AMmiSTisrAi LAw 113 (5th ed. 1970). Both specific and
general statutory provisions permit judicial review on the theory that it is the will
of the legislature. To obtain judicial review when no statutory review is available,
the complainant usually must show that his individual rights have been violated.
Id. at 116.
3 The practitioner may be able to use the extraordinary writs, statutory admin-
istrative review, or a declaratory judgment.
4 DAvis at § 24.01. This point is illustrated in Kinsey v. Adkins, 201 S.E.2d 288
(1973) in which the claimant may have fared better if he had sought judicial review
by appeal rather than mandamus.
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chosen. Reform of the administrative judicial review system is re-
quired to provide swift, rational, and consistent decisions.'
I. JuDiciAL REVIEw IN WEST VIRGINIA
Statutory authority for judicial review in West Virginia is in
the Administrative Procedures Act which provides that "any party
adversely affected by a final order or decision in a contested case
is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter, but noth-
ing in this chapter shall be deemed to prevent other means of
review, redress or relief provided by law."'6 The second clause is the
basis for the use of extraordinary remedies in the judicial review
process. The Act also provides that the court may change the deci-
sion of an agency when the decision affects the "substantial rights"
of the complainant, if the decision also is: (1) a violation of a
constitutional or statutory provision; (2) an agency action made in
excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction; (3) made by unlawful
procedures; (4) affected by an error of law; (5) clearly wrong as
shown by substantial evidence; (6) arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.7
I This note does not discuss other issues pertinent to judicial review such as
ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and standing. The practitioner
should be well aware of the impact of these other factors on the availability of
judicial review. See generally Note, Reviewability of Administrative Action: The
Elusive Search for a Pragmatic Standard 1974 DuKE L.J. 382 in 1973 Federal Ad-
ministrative Law Developments.
' W. VA. CODE Am. § 29A-5-4 (1971 Replacement Volume) (emphasis added).
In addition to the extraordinary writs, the West Virginia Administrative Procedures
Act permits a party to obtain a declaratory ruling from an agency. Such a ruling is
binding on the parties and can be judicially reviewed by the court. Id. § 29A-4-2;
Board of Educ. v. Board of Pub. Works, 144 W. Va. 593, 602-03, 109 S.E.2d 552,
557-58 (1959). A declaratory ruling on the validity of a rule promulgated by an
agency can be sought in the circuit court of Kanawha County. The rule can be
declared invalid if it: (1) exceeds constitutional limitations or statutory authority;
(2) exceeds jurisdiction of the agency; (3) was adopted without compliance with
rule-making procedures required by statute; or (4) is arbitrary or capricious. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 29A-5-1(b) (1971 Replacement Volume). This section requires the
complainant to first seek a declaratory ruling from the agency. Harrison, The
West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, 66 W. VA. L. Rv. 159, 176 (1964).
7 W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 29A-5-4 (1971 Replacement Volume). See also
Comment, 65 W. VA. L. Rxv. 143 (1963). One source has stated that the provision
in this section for contested cases does not provide the right to a hearing but only
the procedure to be used when a hearing is required statutorily or constitutionally.
Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial Review Under West Virginia Administra-
tive Procedures Act Not Applicable to Agency Actions Relating to Internal
Management, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 53, 56 (1966).
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The West Virginia Code implies that extraordinary writs may
be used in administrative judicial review. These writs, particularly
those of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, have been em-
ployed extensively.
At common law mandamus was used to command an official
to perform a duty.8 This writ has evolved to compel an official to
perform a ministerial act and even a discretionary act if the reason
for nonperformance was the officer's arbitrariness or capricious-
ness.9 In West Virginia mandamus is available statutorily"° and
constitutionally," and both the Supreme Court of Appeals and the
circuit courts have original concurrent jurisdiction of mandamus
actions. 2 The West Virginia court has held that mandamus will
not lie unless: (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to relief; (2)
there is a legal duty on the part of the agency to do the thing
petitioner desires; and (3) there is no other appropriate relief. 3
The Supreme Court of Appeals has taken a liberal approach
to the application of mandamus, shaping the remedy to give the
complainant the relief to which he is entitled." This expansion can
I L. JAFFS & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 198 (3d ed. 1968); Davis,
Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in West Virginia, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 1
(1957).
1 State ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Miller, 153 W. Va. 414, 421, 168 SE.2d 820,
825 (1969). The courts, in trying to distinguish between ministerial and discretion-
ary acts, have created an all or nothing proposition; if the act is found to be
ministerial, the court will compel the act to be done. The fallacy of such a proposi-
tion is that the complainant is advocating not that the official had no discretion,
but rather that the denial of the relief sought for the reasons given was an arbitrary
or capricious exercise of discretion. Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administra-
tive Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 308, 333-34 (1967). There is a decided dearth of case
law on the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts, and Davis has
said that any distinction is "undesirable, unworkable, and without practical justifi-
cation." 3 K. DAvis, ADmiNsTRATwE LAW TREATISE § 23.11, at 356 (1958). Jaffe
agrees, stating that any distinction is "unsound and unworkable" and is "apt to
label the result rather than explain it." L. JAFFE, JUDICAL CONTROL OF ADMNiSTrA-
rv ACTION 181 (1965).
* W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-2 (1966).
" W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
22 State ex rel. Summerfield v. Maxwell, 148 W. Va. 535, 538, 135 S.E.2d 741,
744 (1964).
23 State ex rel. Kucera v. Wheeling, 153 W. Va. 538, 542, 170 S.E.2d 367, 369
(1969).
" State ex rel. Booth v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs, 196 S.E.2d 299 (W. Va.
1973); State ex rel. Smoleski v. County Court, 153 W. Va. 307, 168 S.E.2d 521
(1969). In Booth, the court granted, in a rather novel application of mandamus, a
[Vol. 77
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also be noted in Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. Ritchie"1 in which the
court stated that mandamus will not be granted if a sufficient
alternative remedy is available, however, this remedy must be
"equally beneficial, convenient and effective."16
The West Virginia Code provides that prohibition shall lie as
a matter of right where an inferior court, board, or tribunal either
does not have subject matter jurisdiction or exceeds its lawful
jurisdiction.17 At common law this writ was used primarily to re-
strain inferior courts from extending their jurisdiction."s Today,
prohibition is used chiefly to stop action by an agency in the exer-
cise of its judicial or quasi-judicial powers. 9 It cannot be used,
however, to prevent the performance of a ministerial act. Case law
is unclear as to the exact criteria for distinguishing judicial or
quasi-judicial functions from ministerial functions. It appears that
if the agency action has involved discretion, most courts consider
the action to be judicial or quasi-judicial. The use of the term
"quasi-judicial" by the court illustrates the separation of powers
problem. The court seems loath to label the agency's decision-
making power as "judicial" because this would seemingly clothe
the administrative agency with judicial powers. Therefore, the
court often uses "quasi-judicial" or "administrative" to describe
this power, thereby minimizing any separation of powers prob-
lem.20
writ which affected quasi-judicial duties.
11 154 W. Va. 825, 179 S.E.2d 591 (1971).
'a Id. at 832, 179 S.E.2d at 596.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1966).
II State ex rel. Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 143 S.E.2d 535
(1965), commented on in 68 W. VA. L. REV. (1965). In West Virginia, the scope of
the common law writ was broadened to cover inferior ministerial tribunals possess-
ing incidental judicial powers and purely ministerial bodies that attempt to perform
judicial functions. However, the expansion did not include purely administrative
acts as distinguished from judicial or quasi-judicial acts. United States Steel Corp.
v. Stokes, 138 W. Va. 506, 511-12, 76 S.E.2d 474, 477-78 (1953).
" Baker v. O'Brien, 79 W. Va. 101, 90 S.E. 543 (1916).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has had difficulty in drawing
this distinction. In United States Steel Corp. v. Stokes, 138 W. Va. 506, 76 S.E.2d
474 (1953), the court noted the impreciseness of the criteria previously used to
distinguish judicial from quasi-judicial and stated that the determination of facts
and dispensation of compensation benefits was not quasi-judicial. Id. at 512, 76
S.E.2d at 477-78. The court more precisely grasped the problem in State v. Huber,
129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946), when it recognized the legal fiction of treating
boards, commissions, and officials as possessing quasi-judicial powers. Id. at 219,
40 S.E.2d at 24. Yet, despite its admission that there is no justification for the
4
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The West Virginia court's treatment of prohibition is indica-
tive of the need for reform. One source has stated that the court
has expanded the scope of prohibition by holding that when an
agency has the right to conduct hearings in which factual determi-
nations are made, the process is quasi-judicial, even if the agency
primarily performs administrative duties." At the same time, the
court has failed to recognize that prohibition is an inappropriate
means of judicial review because it violates the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies." The purpose of this writ is not
to review agency action but to prevent it.?
Certiorari, on the other hand, is designed to allow review of
judicial or quasi-judicial action if there is no other available judi-
cial review, but it is not available to review purely administrative
action.2 4 This writ is statutorily authorized,2 but it does not re-
place common law certiorari.20 The purpose of the statutory writ
is to enlarge the scope of common law certiorari for those issues
that can be reviewed and for inferior tribunals to whom the writ
applies." Certiorari, like the other extraordinary writs, will not lie
unless the error made cannot be corrected by appeal or writ of
error.28 Since the availability of certiorari depends upon judicial or
quasi-judicial actions, rather than non-judicial actions, the defini-
tional problems encountered with the other extraordinary writs are
also present with certiorari.29
distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial, the court has refused to abrogate
the distinction because of its wide acceptance. Id. at 220, 40 S.E.2d at 24. Addition-
ally, the court has held that there are no specific criteria for determining whether
an act is quasi-judicial or administrative. Wiseman v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 320,
59 S.E.2d 445, 454 (1950). One source has said that this distinction should be based
on whether a "court-type procedure" was used or not. W. GELLwoRN & C. BYs.,
ADmmsTATIVE LAW 138 (5th ed. 1970).
21 Comment, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 62, 65 (1965).
2 This doctrine states that all the administrative review procedures available
must be used before the complainant can seek judicial review, unless such an
exhaustion would be meaningless.
2 DAvis, supra note 1, § 24.04. State ex rel. Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W.
Va. 671, 678, 143 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1965).
24 DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24.02. State v. Martini, 112 W. Va. 174, 178, 163 S.E.
850, 852 (1932).
n W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3-1 to -6 (1966).
- Id. § 53-3-2.
Alderson v. County Comm'rs, 31 W. Va. 633, 643, 8 S.E. 274, 280 (1888).
Ashworth v. Hatcher, 98 W. Va. 323, 325, 128 S.E. 93, 94 (1924).
One authority feels that certiorari is an appropriate remedy if: (1) there is
no other means of review available and (2) the decision making body was required
[Vol. 77
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The extraordinary writs in West Virginia provide an unsatis-
factory means of judicial review since their utilization is hampered
by ambiguous definitional requirements. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has not defined the terminology but
has chosen instead to make determinations on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, it becomes impossible to predict whether a spe-
cific act is judicial, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or administrative.
Consequently, an attorney faces a dilemma; he cannot choose with
any certainty the proper remedy for his particular problem.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EXPANSION OF JuDicIAL REvIEw
Changes in the present system of judicial review are dictated
not only by those inadequacies previously outlined but also by the
prospect of increased demand for judicial review in the future. This
prospective increase is based on the historical growth of judicial
review0 plus an expansion in emphasis on due process in the ad-
ministrative review process.31 Even if the statute creating an ad-
ministrative agency precludes judicial review, the courts may ig-
nore the provision or "judicially interpret" the provision in order
not to preclude all review under all circumstances. 32 This approach
has been employed when the court feels the deprivation or sanction
employed by the agency is not appropriate considering the purpose
of the administrative act." In other words, due process is not af-
forded.
to follow a basic judicial process regardless of whether the action taken could be
characterized as judicial, quasi-judicial, or non-judicial. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSz,
ADMINsTRATIvE LAW 134 (5th ed. 1970). See note 20 supra.
" DAVIS, supra note 1, §§ 1.04-.05; L. JAM & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 203 (3d ed. 1968).
31 Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Agency Determinations,
An Aspect-Procedural Due Process, 9 SAN. DINGo L. REv. 364, 371 (1972).
12 Note, Reviewability: Statutory Limitations on the Availability of Judicial
Review, 1973 DUKE L.J. 253, 272 in 1972 Federal Administrative Law
Developments. This problem is often treated as a jurisdictional question that allows
the courts to intervene regardless of statutory language if the court feels that the
agency has exceeded its jurisdictional limitations. Of course, drawing the distinc-
tion of whether the disputed claim is jurisdictional is very difficult and has led to
further blurring of the limits of judicial review. L. JAFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMnUs-
TRATwE LAW 193 (3d ed. 1968).
m Note, supra note 32, at 267. Such judicial interpretations can lead to rather
ludicrous results. As noted by Davis, the dicta of two Supreme Court cases read
together indicates that the Court could "review all questions without determining
whether they are reviewable." 4 K. DAvis, ADmiSTRATivE LAw TREATISE § 28.01 at
5 (1958).
6
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Although the case law is unclear, it appears that the courts are
employing more stringent due process standards." Davis suggests
that there is increased availability of judicial review if the agency's
action affects property rights and personal liberties rather than
governmentally conferred benefits and privileges.3 However, in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Goldberg v. U.S., that
where the "benefit" is a statutory entitlement, the benefit-
privilege argument should be rejected, and therefore this distinc-
tion appears to be non-existent."
Increased regard for due process has resulted in the expansion
of judicial review into areas that had been exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the administrative agency. For the first time, the
courts have been reviewing informal agency rulings" and even
agency discipline of its employees." Furthermore, the courts have
recently been requiring agencies to promulgate and publish stan-
dards used in decisions so that future decisions and policies are
14 Comment, supra note 31, at 364.
4 K. DAviS, ADMINiSTRATrvE LAW TPaATiSE § 28.19 at 103-07 (1958).
397 U.S. 254 (1970). In this case the Court held that where the "benefit" is
a statutory entitlement, the benefit-privilege argument should be rejected. Id. at
262. But see, Kinsey v. Adkins, 201 S.E.2d 288, 291 (W. Va. 1973), where the court
acknowledged the general rule in Taylor v. Board of Educ., 152 W. Va. 761, 770,
166 S.E.2d 150, 157 (1969), that a pension from a public authority is not a contrac-
tual obligation but a gratuity in which the claimant has no vested right except for
payments already due, yet decided that it would be unfair to apply this rule where
the law requires the recipients of the fund to pay into it. In Nutter v. State Rds.
Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E.2d 549 (1937), the court held that due process
can be provided administratively as well as judicially. The nature of the interest
being affected determines what due process safeguards are required. If the agency
action is a valid exercise of the State's police powers, the due process requirements
are lessened. Id. at 316-17, 193 S.E.2d at 551.
n Independent Broker-Dealer's Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Administrative
Action-Informal Agency Action Held to be Reviewable Pursuant to A.P.A., 3
Rtrruas CAimEN L.J. 533 (1972).
38 United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1970); Comment,
Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Agency's Discipline of Employees Stayed
Pendent Lite, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 353 (1971). But see State ex rel. Burchett v. Taylor,
150 W. Va. 702, 149 S.E.2d 234 (1966), commented on in 69 W. VA. L. Rav. 53
(1966), where the court held that the agency's actions did not fall within the pur-
view of the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act because the action related
solely to internal management and did not affect the public. The court in Burchett
did recognize, however, that judicial review may lie if required statutorily or consti-
tutionally. Thus, with the increasing emphasis on due process, the West Virginia
court may take a more liberal approach to the availability of judicial review in an
agency-employee discipline case in the future.
[Vol. 77
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consistent with the previously announced standards. 9 By requiring
these standards to be published, the courts have in effect invited
public participation in agency affairs. This allows the court to
better weigh the competing societal values inherent in agency de-
terminations."
]1I. PRESENT SOLUTIONS FOR THE JuDIcIAL REVIEW SYSTEMS
It appears that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has recognized the inadequacies of extraordinary writs as a means
of review and has attempted to modify their usage. The adoption
of a new rule of practice by the court has greatly restricted the
ability of a practitioner to invoke the court's original jurisdiction
of extraordinary writs. 1 Now the original jurisdiction cannot be
invoked if adequate relief may be obtained from a court of concur-
rent jurisdiction, and the burden is on the practitioner to show that
the concurrent court's remedy is insufficient. 2 The practical effect
of this change will make it difficult to bypass the circuit courts and
go directly to the Supreme Court of Appeals. A second change has
been an expansion of the scope of these writs so they can provide
the remedy the court feels appropriate. 3 These changes indicate a
judicial recognition of the inherent limitations in the use of the
extraordinary writs, but it is unlikely that these measures will
31 Note, Recent Changes in the Scope of Judicial Control Over Administrative
Methods of Decisionmaking, 49 IND. L.J. 118, 120 (1973). The courts have been
doing this by (1) requiring the agency to set standards before it can make a determi-
nation; (2) increasing reliance on stare decisis by not permitting the agency to
change its policy unless it can justify the change; (3) establishing more stringent
requirements for what constitutes a fair hearing; (4) requiring the agency to address
issues raised by public interest groups; and (5) relaxing the criteria for standing.
Id. at 140.
11 Such decisions seem consistent with the intent shown by Congress to allow
greater citizen intervention through the process of citizen's suits. See, e.g., Note,
Environmental Law-Air Pollution A batement-A Supplemental Damage Remedy
Under the Clean Air Act, 75 W. VA. L. Rsv. 266 (1973); Note, Environmental Law
-The National Environmental Policy Act, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 522 (1974). The
agencies themselves are recognizing this problem, and one source has suggested
that the agencies initiate their own system for handling citizen's complaints. Rosen-
blum, Handling Citizen Initiated Complaints: An Introductory Study of Federal
Agency Procedures and Practices, 26 AD. L. Rsv. 1 (1974).
" W. VA. R. PRAc. SuP. CT. OF App. XVIII; Sullivan, An Extraordinary Rule:
Rule XVIII, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1974).
42 Sullivan, supra note 41, at 10.
'3 See notes 14-16 supra.
8
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completely eliminate all the problems associated with the use of
extraordinary writs in the judicial process; another solution is re-
quired.
The best solution is Davis's proposal to entirely eliminate ex-
traordinary writs and replace them with a single means of judicial
review." This solution offers several advantages. It would: (1) re-
duce and simplify the number of remedies available; (2) provide a
uniform system of judicial review that would promote consistency
in the decision making process; (3) reduce the separation of powers
problem; and (4) allow more cases to be heard on their merits
rather than on procedural questions. This concept has been imple-
mented with varying degrees of success in eight states by either
statute, rule of court or civil procedure, or constitutional amend-
ment.
The most common method of abolishing extraordinary writs,
by statute, has been used in New York,"5 Missouri, " Wisconsin,"
and Illinois. s Analysis of cases decided under these statutes shows
that many of the problems that were meant to be eliminated have
not in fact disappeared. In New York, the special proceeding for
review was intended to eliminate procedural distinctions of the
extraordinary writs but preserve the remedies these writs pro-
vided. " In interpreting this statute, the courts have used the na-
ture of the alleged grievance to determine the form of the hearing,
the questions to be determined, and the relief that can be
granted."0 According to one authority, the result of these decisions
has been a retreat from the intent of the statute because manda-
mus and certiorari have been restored except in name." Worst of
all, the courts have denied relief because of the improper choice of
DAviS, supra note 1, § 24.01 at 459.
,s N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 7801 (McKinney 1963).
46 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.100 (1953).
'7 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.15 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
,' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 265 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
4' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 7801, Comment (McKinney 1963).
Board of Educ. v. Parsons, 61 Misc. 2d 838, 306 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.
1969). Weintraub, Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Action: From State Writs to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 38
ST. JoHNs L. Rav. 86, 121 (1963).
56 Id. at 122. The courts have been reluctant to say that the writs have been
abolished because of the significant differences among actions in the nature of
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition plus the continued use of cases. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. § 7801, Comment (McKinney 1963).
[Vol. 77
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a writ, the very problem that Davis's solution should avoid."
The Wisconsin and Missouri statutes for judicial review have
also been weakened by case law. In State ex rel. Thompson v.
Nash, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that statutory review
provisions may not be followed if there is substantial showing of a
denial of due process that cannot be rectified under this statute. 3
In Missouri, the availability of the judicial review procedure de-
pends on whether the action in question is characterized as a "con-
tested case" and when this is not found, the extraordinary writs
may be used." In Kopper Kettle Restaurant Inc. v. St. Paul, the
plaintiff was faced with this problem and the fact that the choice
of the wrong remedy would be fatal to its interests.55
In contrast to the problems of New York, Wisconsin, and Mis-
souri, the Illinois system of judicial review has received more flexi-
ble treatment by its courts and thereby retained the advantages
of Davis's single system of review. The Illinois courts have recog-
nized that application of the Illinois Administrative Review Act"
precludes the use of the extraordinary writs.57 Satisfaction of the
Illinois legislature with this means of review is evidenced by the
fact that the Act is incorporated into 175 separate provisions of the
Illinois statutes. The only problem Illinois has had with this sys-
tem is that it is only applicable to acts and procedures that ex-
pressly provide the Illinois Administrative Review Act as the
means of judicial review. 5 This requirement has led to a slight
judicial retreat from the principle of unified judicial review where
a more liberal reading of the statutory law was available."
Colorado has abolished the use of extraordinary writs by a rule
of the Supreme Court of Colorado,"1 but in doing so it has not
11 E.g., Bar Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 174, 299 N.Y.S.2d 194, 246
N.E.2d 157 (1969).
13 27 Wisc. 2d 183, 194, 133 N.W.2d 769, 776 (1965).
- Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.100 (1953).
439 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1969), commented on in 36 Mo. L. Rlv. 444 (1971).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-79 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
"E.g., Hulman v. Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 122 Ill. App. 2d 363, 368-69, 259
N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1970).
" Fins, Need for Uniformity in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions,
61 ILL. B.J. 366 (1973).
" Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Iil. 2d 567, 572, 216 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1966).
10 See People ex rel. Peterson v. Valencik, 131 Ill. App. 2d 264, 267, 266 N.E.2d
752, 754 (1970); People ex rel. Dickey v. White, 59 fI1. App. 2d 148, 152, 204 N.E.2d
170, 172 (1965).
61 COLO. SuP. CT. R. 106(a).
10
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avoided those problems previously mentioned. The Supreme Court
of Colorado has held that the substantive aspects of the extraordi-
nary writs are preserved and that the relief available by mandamus
is to be granted in accordance with precedents under prior prac-
tices.2 This holding indicates that Colorado is still tied to many
of the procedural technicalities inherent in the use of extraordinary
writs.
Utah has abolished the use of extraordinary writs by a rule of
civil procedure63 that is patterned after the Colorado rule.6" This
rule allows the use of extraordinary writs in a wide range of specific
circumstances and when there is no speedy relief available."3 Even
though the Utah courts have strictly construed these statutory
exceptions, the effect of case law has been to cling to many of the
technicalities of the extraordinary writs.6
New Jersey has combined a constitutional provision" with
statutory provisions 6 to abolish extraordinary writs. This ap-
proach was intended to avoid the technical procedural problems
inherent in the use of extraordinary writs but to retain their sub-
stance."9 The New Jersey courts have recognized the flexibility of
the judicial review system and have allowed other means of relief
to be used to avoid multiplicity of actions." Unfortunately, in al-
lowing these additional writs, the courts still make distinctions
such as ministerial or quasi-judicial to determine whether to allow
these writs to be used.7 '
Abolishing the extraordinary writs from the judicial review
system has often meant a change in form rather than substance.
This is unfortunate, because it tends to foster inequity in the judi-
cial review process that will be further complicated by increased
future demands for judicial review. The courts' reluctance to abol-
62 Ahern v. Baker, 148 Colo. 408, 414, 366 P.2d 366, 368 (1961).
3 UTAH R. Civ. PRoc. 65(B).
1, Id., Comment.
UTAH R. Crv. PRAc. 65(B)(a).
66 Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977 (1958).
N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5, 4.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:66-1 to -14 (1952).
" Schnitzer, Procedure in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, 4 RuroGns L. REv. 323,
324 (1949).
10 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 82 N.J. Super. 133, 196 A.2d
808 (1964), aff'd on rehearing, 87 N.J. Super. 486, 210 A.2d 78 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 47 N.J. 92, 219 A.2d 505 (1966).
7' Colon v. Tedesco, 125 N.J. Super. 446, 311 A.2d 393 (1973).
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ish these writs is understandable in light of their historical signifi-
cance and often unique remedies. It must be recognized that
Davis's proposal was not to abolish these remedies but only to
allow their usage in a more flexible manner. 2 This would allow the
courts to provide the appropriate remedy without concern for the
technicalities. Without judicial awareness of the reasons for a sin-
gle system of judicial review, it will be fruitless to revamp the
review procedure.
IV. A. SOLUTION FOR WEST VIRGINIA
The best method for reform of the judicial review process in
West Virginia would be to abolish the use of extraordinary writs
by modification of that section of the West Virginia Administrative
Procedures Act that deals with judicial review. 3 Abolition of the
writs is necessary because mere modification of their use will leave
the possibility of circumvention of the desired goal. Statutory abo-
lition would be more practical than a constitutional amendment
which requires a vote of the electorate. Since the present system
of judicial review in West Virginia has been legislatively estab-
lished, statutory abolishment is more appropriate than abolish-
ment by a rule of the Supreme Court of Appeals.
To be effective, this statute must receive the proper judicial
interpretation.7" The reviewing court must recognize that although
the extraordinary writs are abolished, the remedies these writs
provide are still available to the court when it feels they are appro-
priate, and that the appropriate relief should be granted even
though the practitioner may not accurately name or describe the
writ he is seeking.
72 DAvis, supra note 1, § 24.07.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-4. By changing paragraph (a) of this section
which presently reads: "Any party adversely affected by a final order or decision
in a contested case is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter, but
nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to prevent other means of review, redress
or relief provided by law," to the one below, the extraordinary writs could be
eliminated:
(a) Any person who is adversely affected by a final order or decision in a
contested case is entitled to judicial review provided in this act. In all such cases,
the use of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari or any other statutory, equitable,
or common law means of review of administrative decisions heretofore available
shall not be employed after the effective date hereof.
7' See the problems encountered in other states discussed in notes 49-66 supra
and accompanying text.
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The development of administrative law is well documented,
and the trend is toward even greater growth." With the growth of
administrative agencies, there is a concomitant need for increased
judicial review to protect against the possibilities of abuses of
power. 7 The increased emphasis on due process will also greatly
expand the demands for judicial review into areas that are cur-
rently unreviewable. 77 Thus, the time is ripe for the Legislature to
reform the judicial review of administrative actions in West Vir-
ginia. The increased demand for judicial review, coupled with the
current inadequacies, make the West Virginia system ill-equipped
to provide the judicial review of administrative actions that is
required.
Roy V. Creasy
7 See notes 30 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
78 Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Agency's Discipline of
Employees Stayed Pendent Lite, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 353 (1971).
n See notes 37 & 38 supra.
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